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The original motivation for this paper stems from the various tax proposals the aviation 
business is constantly faced with. For example, the governments of the developed countries 
have repeatedly stressed their conjoint intention to increase development policies and the 
additional funds needed could possibly be raised by higher taxation of the airline business 
(see e.g. Landau Report, 2004). Before the implementation of such a joint strategy, clearly, a 
lot of interstate questions are to be concerned. However, the analysis of tax effects must 
include characteristics that are peculiar to the industry. A prominent feature is price 
discrimination being virtually omnipresent in the airline business. Under price discrimination 
different consumers pay different prices for identical goods. Sales taxes will change each 
price, stiring the question how the burden is shared between consumers grouped by the 
distinct prices they pay. Obviously, the problem is not just one of the airline industry, many 
more examples for price discrimination are easily found in other service sectors and industries 
with high fixed costs. Theatres, swimming baths, amusement parks and others more offer a 
range of discounts for children, students or senior citizens and libraries pay higher prices for 
journals than private subscribers. Consequently, some general results on the distribution of the 
tax burden across consumer groups should be established here. The incidence analysis 
performed here is a partial equilibrium analysis and considers mainly the economic division 
of the tax payment. 
Restricting incidence analyses to a single equilibrium price, perfectly competitive or not, 
public finance economists were able to focus on the burden sharing between market sides. But 
with different consumers paying various prices for one and the same good or service the 
notion of the (single) tax incidence is no longer meaningful. Rather, there are as many 
incidences as distinct prices and thereby consumer groups exist. Consequently, tax incidence 
has to be studied for each segment or consumer group separately. Next to these conventional 
incidence studies, though increased in number, there immediately arises the question how the 
tax burden is distributed over the different consumer groups. This problem is discussed here. 
A precondition for price discrimination consists of some monopolistic leeway on the supply 
side
1 which entails the necessity to compare unit and ad valorem taxes
2. Will both tax types 
result in the same distribution of tax burdens, or can governments discriminate between 
consumer groups though employing identical tax rates across all segments? Suits and 
Musgrave (1953) nicely established the result that the effects of unit and ad valorem taxes 
1 For further prerequisites see Carlton and Perloff (2005, p. 294). 
2 Both tax types are being used all around the world in the airline business (see IATA,2005) and are debated for 
an increase. 
4differ in monopoly and thus carry the potential for fiscal discrimination between consumers 
and producers. Interest in the comparison of these tax types has never ended (see e.g. 
Blackorby and Murty, 2007 or Myles, 1996). Analyzing both tax types simultaneously in the 
conjectural variations model Delipalla and Keen (1992) show for homogenous goods that ad 
valorem taxes raising the same revenue as unit taxes always result in lower equilibrium prices 
for any number of suppliers. Allowing for many suppliers, however, there exists only one 
single market price which renders a comparison of tax burdens across consumer groups 
paying distinct prices impossible. Different prices can be found in models with vertical 
product differentiation where consumers no longer buy identical goods. 
For isolating effects, the focus here lies on homogenous goods and price discrimination of 
third degree. With respect to this kind of discrimination Yang (1993) confirms all results of 
the seminal work by Suits and Musgrave. Yang extends the results to all segments looking on 
the comparison in an aggregate form rather than concerning the distribution across segments. 
In the same aggregate way Cheung (1998) expands the comparison of tax types to the other 
two forms of Pigouvian price discrimination. Perloff and Wu (2007) are to my knowledge the 
first trying to find a relationship between tax incidences across consumer groups. However, 
their result that the ratio of after- and pre-tax prices differs from segment to segment just 
confirms that tax induced price changes do not depend on pre-tax prices. Price changes and 
therefore after-tax prices depend on some kind of demand and supply elasticities. 
Reformulating the Perloff and Wu result shows that they ask whether price changes follow the 
specific distribution of pre-tax prices, whereas I answer the question how prices change in 
comparison to one another. 
In a first step price changes are considered. Their distribution pattern is invariant to the tax 
type as price changes of each segment are related exclusively by the elasticities of the slopes 
of the inverse demand functions. Consequently, there is no opportunity for fiscal 
discrimination. In a second step the significance of market shares for the distribution of tax 
burdens across consumer groups will be pointed out. Conventional incidence analysis can 
truly neglect quantity aspects as there exists only a single price and only one equilibrium 
quantity. Looking at the distribution of tax burdens across consumer groups, however, one 
clearly has to account for the amounts traded as they are integral parts of each segment’s tax 
payment. Comparing unit and ad valorem taxes raising the same revenue now displays an 
opportunity for fiscal discrimination between consumer groups. However, such discrimination 
is erratic and is not due to price discrimination as such. 
5In chapter two the basic model is set up which is followed by chapter three establishing the 
impossibility result of fiscal discrimination. In chapter four the significance of relative market 
shares for the distribution of tax burden is pointed out establishing the discrimination 
possibility result. Chapter five concludes with some general remarks on the appropriate 
measure for the comparison of tax burdens. 
2. The basic model 
To clearly identify the effects of price discrimination on the distribution of the tax burden the 
model is based on the standard textbook example (e.g. Silberberg and Suen, 2001, p. 71f). A 
monopolist is faced with n distinct consumer groups, each having its own independent inverse 
demand function pi(xi). All demand functions are downward sloping and at least twice 
differentiable
3. Other than the bulk of the literature and Perloff and Wu, the model is not 
restricted to constant marginal costs. Hence, it is no longer possible to look at each segment as 
a single independent market. By this it is unfeasible to formulate and solve separate though by 
structure identical maximization problems as market segments are linked by the cost function. 
Costs depend on the sum of all equilibrium quantities, C(Ȉxi). The government interferes with 
this market by sales taxes. Tax rates t and Ĳ of unit and ad valorem tax, respectively are 
identical across segments so that government does not directly discriminate between different 








1 i i i n 1 ) C( x t] ) ( p Ĳ) [(1 ) x ,..., ʌ(x i i x x
The resulting FOCs for i=1,…,n are 
(2) ii i (1 Ĳ)(p x p ) t C cc    
with a prime denoting the derivative with respect to the particular quantity. In equilibrium, 
marginal revenue in segment i net of taxes equals marginal costs of producing xi. Owing to 
the joint production of the homogeneous good for all segments - the monopolist ultimately 
decides on the distribution of total output - marginal costs in each and every segment reach 
the same value in equilibrium. Consequently, marginal revenues net of taxes must be identical  
(3) t ) p x p Ĳ)( (1 t ) p x p Ĳ)( (1 j j j i i i   c      c    for i, j=1,…,n.  
With government not directly discriminating between consumer groups tax rates for each 
segment are the same and so are gross marginal revenues  i i i i p x p MR  c   . This standard 
result for price discrimination is not affected by uniform tax rates of either type. As MRi is 
                                                
3 Seade (1980) shows the stability conditions for Cournot competition. 
6constant in i, the index is dropped in what follows. Second order conditions are assumed to 
hold.
3. Pattern of price changes 
Conventional incidence analysis with a single consumer group only, studies how the tax 
burden is split between demand and supply. Consumers bear the tax in form of the gross price 
change, producers in the extent of the reduction
4 of equilibrium net price. With perfect 
competition this reduction equals the decrease in marginal costs, with imperfect competition, 
however, the producers’ share in tax payments is reflected in the absolute tax amount per unit 
minus the gross price increase. That is why tax analyses regularly concentrate on gross price 
changes. Following this, gross price changes are considered as it is completely sufficient for 
contrasting the effects of taxation in each segment with one another. Comparing price changes 
reveals a systematic relationship between the changes that depends on the particular elasticity 
of the slope of the inverse demand functions as will be seen below. In a first step the marginal 
quantity change of a segment, dxi, is established leading to  
Proposition  1:  Next to the rate of change of the respective marginal revenue the quantity 
change in a single segment additionally depends on the quantity changes in all 
segments.
Differentiating the system of equations (2) for tax rates t and Ĳ and all variables xi leads to n 
equations
(4)  . n
j1 ii j MR dĲ dt (1 Ĳ)MR dx C dx 0   ¦ cc c      
Having two degrees of freedom, the change in quantity, dxi, in reaction to a change in tax 
rates dĲ and dt is given by
(5) dt
C R M Ĳ) (1
1
dĲ MR

















   
c c  c 
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c c  c 
   .
The proof is deferred to the appendix. Marginal changes in one tax rate holding the other one 
constant affect equilibrium quantities in the same way bearing in mind that with the ad 
valorem tax the marginal revenue factor is to be included
5. The first term in the denominator 
reflects the rate of change of the marginal revenue. In case of perfect competition this is the 
rate of the price change but clearly not so in case of imperfect competition. The second term 
                                                
4 Net prices can also rise, for an example of „overshifting“ see Delipalla and Keen (1992, p. 356). 
5 For an application of this standard result see Delipalla and Keen (1992, p. 357f). 
7presents the change in marginal costs. Contrary to conventional incidence analysis with only 
one consumer group and a single equilibrium quantity the change in marginal costs with price 
discrimination must include the quantity changes in all segments or total output. If xi changes 
so do all the others unless the demand functions are completely inelastic. This relationship 
between segment quantities is covered in the final factor.  
Price changes can now be found by multiplying the marginal change of quantities as 
established in (5) with the derivative of the particular inverse demand function. The 
comparison of tax induced price changes across segments yields  
Proposition 2:  With regard to the pattern of price changes governments cannot discriminate 
between different consumer groups by the choice of sales tax types.
Instead of equation (5) the identity condition (3) is reconsidered as this offers a much smarter 
way to compare price changes. In equilibrium marginal revenues in each segment are the 
same before and after the tax change. Therefore, changes in marginal revenue are the same for 
all segments 
(6) j j j i i i dMR dx R M dx R M dMR   c   c    . 
Displaying the derivative of marginal revenue explicitly and factoring out   leads 
immediately to  
i pc








c c    the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function (see Delipalla and 
Keen, 1992, p. 354 and the literature cited there). Consider, for example, segment i as the base 
market, then price changes in all secondary segments follow the base market price change 
with factor (Ȗi+2)/(Ȗj+2). Clearly, the pattern of price changes is completely independent of 
the sales tax type. Therefore, it is impossible for government to discriminate between 
consumer groups by the choice of tax type
6.
Moreover, the pattern of price changes is obviously not as “uneven” as suggested by Perloff 
and Wu
7 but reveals some systematics. 
                                                
6 Looking at changes of consumer rents reveals the same distribution pattern thereby confirming the 
impossibility result. 
7 “(...) a tax may have an uneven effect on various parts of the price distribution (...)”, Perloff and Wu (2007). 
84. Pattern of tax burdens 
Without any losses conventional incidence analysis can restrict itself to a comparison of mere 
price changes for demand and supply side. The amount traded is completely irrelevant for the 
distribution of the tax burden as demand equals supply. Quantities are still negligible studying 
the tax split between consumers and producers segment by segment. But to come to 
conclusions on the distribution of tax burdens across consumer groups the quantity aspect 
must necessarily be included
8 unless quantities traded under the tax are all identical. The 
reason for this is simply that a price change only represents the absolute tax amount per unit 
of the good for the consumer. To arrive at the tax burden it has to be multiplied by the 
quantity traded under the tax. If after-tax quantities differ from segment to segment the 
distribution of tax burdens cannot exclusively depend on gross price changes. Instead, one can 
state
Proposition 3:  Relative market shares determine the distribution of tax burdens next to the 
ratio of price changes. 
The fraction of total tax revenue a particular consumer group has to bear with a unit tax 
imposed is  
(8)
¦ ¦
   




















On the right hand side this consumer fraction is represented by the product of the 
conventional incidence measure which is the gross price change per tax amount and the 
market share under taxation. Comparing consumer fractions of total tax revenue and plugging 
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Next to the elasticities already explained the distribution of tax burden is determined by the 
relative market share after taxation. 
Analogously to (8), a consumer group’s fraction under ad valorem taxation is  
(10)
¦ ¦
   






















                                                
8 Folkers (1988, p. 227 ff) explicitly checks on after-tax quantities studying tax exemptions for taxpayers with 
different tax rates. 
9The right side of the equation again explicitly displays the difference to the conventional 
incidence measure. The tax rate Ĳ is not multiplied by the after tax gross price of the particular 
segment   but by an “average” price meaning that total sales are divided by the single 
segment’s quantity. Identical in structure with (9) the relationship between two consumer 
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In contrast to proposition 3 which states the impossibility of fiscal discrimination, the 
comparison of tax types concerning relative tax burdens leads to the unapparent  
Proposition 4:  With regard to the relative tax burden governments can discriminate between 
different consumer groups by the choice of sales tax types. 
Though looking similar the equivalence of equations (9) and (11) only regards the structure 
and not the numerical values which clearly is a limitation of the identity result of tax effects. 
Contrasting different tax types only reveals thorough information when both yield the same 
revenue in the end. From differential incidence analysis it is well known that ad valorem taxes 
dominate unit taxes in efficiency terms in cases of monopolistic competition. This result is 
confirmed for price discrimination as well (see Yang, 1993, p. 373 and Cheung, 1998, p. 
1200). Therefore, with unit and ad valorem taxes resulting in different equilibrium quantities 
it cannot be taken for granted that relative market shares equal each other across tax types. 
Relative market shares and hence relative tax burdens are instead very likely to differ. For an 
outstanding example assume two marginal revenue curves intersecting in some point. At this 
point relative market share equals one. Assume equilibrium quantities before taxes to be 
somewhere on the right of the intersection. Now an ad valorem tax is imposed resulting in an 
equilibrium slightly on the right of the intersection with a relative market share just smaller 
(bigger) than one. The unit tax yielding the same revenue leads to greater price distortions and 
consequently, equilibrium quantities are found on the left of the intersection with relative 
market share now being bigger (smaller) than one.  
This clearly shows some potential for fiscal discrimination with regard to the distribution of 
tax burdens across consumer groups. However, this potential is limited in scope and erratic in 
the sense that one cannot say in general for all goods and services which consumer group 
identified by pre-tax prices or pre-tax market shares is discriminated against by one tax type 
10or the other. The discrimination is rather piecemeal and must separately be studied for any 
good and service that is traded in price discriminatory fashion. The reason for this is simply 
that the quantity traded under a tax regime does not only depend on the shape of the demand 
function but additionally on its position as Folkers (1988, p. 230) shows with a linear 
example. With the relative market share as an integral part of the tax burden distribution it is 
decisive whether the quantity of a segment is 100 or reaches 1000. The (relative) positions of 
the other demand functions clearly matter, too. The result that the government is able to 
discriminate between consumer groups, though only indirectly, is obviously not due to price 
discrimination per se but as the arguments show caused by the distinct effects of unit and ad 
valorem taxes in imperfectly competitive settings. Independently of a certain market segment 
the ad valorem tax leads to less distortion. 
5. Conclusion 
Whenever different consumers pay different prices for one and the same good or service it is 
necessary to extend conventional tax incidence analysis in two directions. Firstly, 
conventional analysis of how the burden is split between demand and supply has to be 
accomplished for each market segment separately. Secondly, the question of how the burden 
is shared between the different segments and hence consumer groups awaits an answer. This 
was given here. The analysis showed that starting from some base market tax induced price 
changes in all other segments follow systematically according to the particular elasticities of 
the slope of the inverse demand functions. Additionally, the pattern of price changes is 
invariant with regard to the sales tax type so that an impossibility for fiscal discrimination 
between consumer groups arises. Averting away from price changes towards the distribution 
of tax burden one has to include equilibrium quantities into the analysis. Relative market 
shares enter the distributional analysis as a factor next to relative price changes. With this an 
opportunity for fiscal discrimination opens up. However, this potential is limited and rather an 
effect of a sufficient monopolistic leeway on the supply side.
Contrasting both sales taxes with regard to the incidence between consumer groups could also 
have been done on the basis of consumer surpluses or their marginal changes. The latter 
would have confirmed the impossibility result, the former the possibility outcome with the 
limitation that without more information about the different demand functions
9 one cannot 
say which consumer group is worse off by one or the other tax type. The overall result of ad 
valorem taxes generating less distortion persists. Which measure - be it levels or their changes 
                                                
9 Trandel (1999) like Hines, Hlinko and Lubke (1995) study linear demand curves only.  
11- should underlie the study of incidence between consumer groups depends on the analyst’s 
aims and was not discussed here. Instead, positive analysis was predominant leading to the 
insight that changes in prices and consumer surpluses occur in a fix systematic way. If the 
underlying levels price, tax burden and consumer surplus follow any different pattern or none 
at all, the distribution assessment must inevitably differ. From exactly this perspective the 
uneven result of Perloff and Wu is to reconsider. They just compare changes with the 
underlying levels and cannot find any systematic outcome. 
6. Appendix 
The proof of equation (5) is performed most conveniently in matrix form. Totally 
differentiating the system of FOCs (2) leads to n equations of form  
(A1)  . dt dĲ MR dx C dx R M Ĳ) (1
n
1 j
j i i    c c  c  ¦
 
Marginal revenue MR is not indexed as it is the same in all segments. In matrix form the left 
hand side can be displayed as the vector of quantity changes times the sum of a -C´´ matrix 
with the negative of the second derivative of the cost function for every element and a 
diagonal matrix containing the derivatives of the marginal renues  
(A2)
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Adding the first summand on both sides and multiplying with the inverse of the diagonal 
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Subtracting the final term on both sides, factoring out dxi and rearranging terms again gives  
(A6) dt
C R M Ĳ) (1
1
dĲ
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